Is there introspective evidence for phenomenal intentionality? by Bordini, Davide
 1 
Is There Introspective Evidence for Phenomenal Intentionality? 
 
Davide Bordini 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Milan 
davide.bordini@gmail.com 
 
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies 
[Penultimate draft, July, 2016]* 
 
Abstract. The so-called transparency of experience (henceforth TE) is the intuition that, in 
introspecting one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (like colors, shapes, 
etc.) as features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers 
of mind and has traditionally been used to motivate Representationalism, i.e. the view that 
phenomenal character is in some strong way dependent on intentionality. However, more recently, 
others have appealed to TE to go the opposite way and support the Phenomenal Intentionality View 
(PIV), according to which intentionality is in some strong way dependent on phenomenal 
character. If this line of argument succeeds, then not only TE does not speak in favor of 
Representationalism, but it actually speaks against it, contrary to the philosophical common-sense 
of the last two decades. Moreover, the representationalist project of naturalizing phenomenal 
character turns out to be seriously undermined on the same intuitive grounds that were supposed 
to make it plausible. In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss the line of argument from TE to PIV 
and argue that our introspective intuitions (TE) do not push us in the direction of PIV. On the 
contrary, the line of argument from TE to PIV is (at best) simply too weak to force us to conclude 
that intentionality depends on phenomenal character in the sense required for PIV to be true. 
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The so-called transparency of experience (henceforth TE) is the intuition that, in introspecting 
one’s own experience, one is only aware of certain properties (e.g., colors, shapes, etc.) as features 
of (apparently) mind-independent objects. TE is quite popular among philosophers of mind. 
Traditionally, it has been used to motivate the representationalist claim that phenomenal character 
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(experience’s what-it’s-like-ness) is in some strong way dependent on intentionality (experience’s 
having representational content) against the traditional separatist orthodoxy, according to which, 
instead, no inherent connection obtains between phenomenal character and intentionality.  
Representationalism has arguably been the mainstream view of consciousness over the last 
two decades. Despite this, some theorists have recently opposed this view and have argued that 
intentionality is in some strong sense dependent on phenomenal character. This is the Phenomenal 
Intentionality View (henceforth PIV). Interestingly, the PIV supporters usually appeal to TE as 
well and argue that it offers direct evidence for PIV: appreciating PIV’s truth would simply be a 
matter of attentively paying attention to what we gather from introspection on our own experiences 
(e.g., Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2004)—namely, TE. They thus build up a line of argument 
that leads from TE to PIV.  
While introspective considerations seem to be always (and quite naturally) in order when it 
comes to discussions of phenomenal character, it might seem prima facie curious that two opposite 
camps appeal to the same intuition as evidence in support of two opposite theses. So, since 
associating TE and Representationalism is philosophically common-place, a question naturally 
arises as to whether TE really counts as evidence in support of PIV, that is: whether it really 
supports the phenomenal intentionality claim.  
Answering this question is important because, if the line of argument from TE to PIV really 
is successful, then a powerful case in support of PIV can be made. For, if TE is actually what we 
gather from introspection, then it seems that considering our introspective intuitions alone—and I 
will clarify exactly how “alone” is to be understood later—pushes us to conclude that PIV is true. 
This is relevant not only in the light of the widespread consensus surrounding TE, but also in 
consideration of its important consequences. That is, first, the philosophical common-sense of the 
last twenty years, i.e. that TE makes a strong case in support of Representationalism, turns out to 
be overturned. Second, more importantly (and somewhat ironically), the representationalist 
mainstream about phenomenal character (along with its proposal for the naturalization of 
phenomenal character) is overturned as well, on the very same intuitive grounds that were 
supposed to make it a plausible and appealing option. 
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In this paper, I reconstruct and discuss the line of argument from TE to PIV and offer a 
negative reply to the question above: our introspective intuitions (TE)1 do not push us in the 
direction of PIV. On the contrary, the line of argument from TE to PIV is (at best) simply too weak 
to force us to conclude that intentionality depends on phenomenal character in the sense required 
for PIV to be true. So, the PIV supporters are wrong. 
Schematically, here is how I will proceed. After offering a quick survey of the debate on the 
relations between intentionality and phenomenal character (§2), I will argue for the following two 
substantive claims: 
 
(1)  Representationalists and phenomenal intentionalists appeal to the same 
introspective datum, TE. 
(2)  Arguing from TE to PIV leads us to the following trilemma: either (a) the argument 
is too weak or (b) it is not from TE or (c) it is to be rejected—where (a) is the best 
case and (b) and (c) are the worst cases. 
 
In section 3, I will be concerned with (1); in sections 4-7 I will deal with (2). The upshot will be: 
as far as our introspective intuitions (TE) are concerned, at best we are not forced to buy into PIV; 
at worst, buying into PIV runs us into serious trouble (§8). So, the line of argument from TE to 
PIV is not only far less powerful than the PIV supporters would like it to be, but it is also quite 
dangerous and, thus, not so convenient, after all—despite what it looked like prima facie. 
 
2 Setup 
Let me start with offering more details on the terminology and the background. This will serve us 
to better characterize the views on the table and appreciate the depth of the challenge raised by 
PIV.  
 
2.1. Intentionality and phenomenal character 
                                                      
1 I do not question here whether TE actually is an introspective intuition that we have. Nor do I consider alternate 
descriptions of what we gather from introspection that challenge or call into question TE. For the purposes of this 
paper, I just assume that TE is genuinely what we gather from introspection. More details on the assumptions that I 
will be making about TE and its scope will be offered in section 3. 
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A traditional distinction in the philosophy of mind is between phenomenal character and 
intentionality. Consider an example. At the moment, I am seeing a red car parked across the street. 
Now, what can I say about this experience? In the first place, it seems quite natural to say that it 
“tells” me something about how things are in the world. For example, it tells me that something is 
red and with a certain shape, that it is in front of me now occupying a certain portion of the space, 
and so on. As long as it is in the business of telling me something, my experience represents that 
something is a certain way. What an experience represents is its representational content, which 
is usually understood in terms of conditions of satisfaction. Roughly, the idea is that, in telling us 
something about the world, our experiences are providing us with the conditions at which they are 
accurate (or inaccurate). So when I have an experience as of a red car, that experience tells me 
that the world is such that there is something red, with a certain shape, etc., in front of me now. If 
there is something in front of me now that is red, has that particular shape, etc., then my experience 
“tells me the truth” about the world: it is accurate. Otherwise, it is inaccurate.2 Having a certain 
content requires experience to instantiate certain representational properties—e.g., the property 
of representing that something is red, the property of representing that something is occupying a 
certain portion of space, etc.3 Usually, experiences (or more generally mental states) that have 
representational contents are said to be intentional or, equivalently, to have intentionality. 
However, there is not just something that my experience represents, but also something that 
it is like for me to be in it. In other words, my experience as of a red car not only represents things 
as being a certain way, but it also feels a certain way. When I look at the red car, I have a red-
experience with its own peculiar red-feeling, which is qualitatively different from (say) the green-
feeling of a green-experience. Likewise, seeing a red car feels to me qualitatively different from 
(say) seeing a red bike or from having a terrible toothache or getting angry at somebody. This 
what-it’s-likeness—the qualitative character that seems to inherently accompany every conscious 
                                                      
2 More complicated stories might be told about the representational content of experience; however, for the purposes 
of this paper, a characterization in terms of conditions of satisfaction will be enough. 
3 Another dispute is as to whether the best way to capture the content of the experience is in terms of existential content 
(i.e., content involving an existential quantifier) or singular content (i.e., content involving a singular object). Since 
this issue is orthogonal to what I am discussing here, I want to stay neutral on this in this paper. However, admittedly, 
my formulation does suggest an understanding of representational content as existential content: this is mainly because 
existential content seems to be what the supporters of the views I am discussing here usually have in mind when they 
talk about representational content. So, my formulation wants to reflect this fact and configures more as a matter of 
terminology than of substance, in the present context. Those who prefer singular content can operate the relevant 
terminological substitutions and follow my arguments without any significant loss with regards to the main points I 
will be making here.   
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experience—is the phenomenal character of the experience itself. Just as intentionality involves 
the instantiation of representational properties, phenomenal character requires phenomenal 
properties to be instantiated by the experience.  
 
2.2. Separatism versus Inseparatism(s) 
If the prima facie distinction between intentionality and phenomenal character is legitimate, it 
seems fair to say that, even though experience is one and unitary, it still exhibits two prima facie 
different dimensions: an intentional and a phenomenal one. But, then, a question immediately 
arises: How are these two dimensions related—if at all?  
Philosophers have divided as to the answer we should give to such a question. According to 
some, phenomenal properties are “representationally inert.” In other words, they are not 
(necessarily) involved in the business of representing; on the contrary, they are introspectible, non-
representational, intrinsic qualities of the experience itself. Conversely, representational 
properties do not contribute to phenomenal character. The upshot, then, is that phenomenal 
character and intentionality are mutually independent and, as such, separable: although they often 
happen to occur together, there is no internal or necessary connection between them. This is 
Separatism, and it used to be the orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind (e.g., Nagel 1974; 
Peacocke1983; Block 1990). 
However, during the last two decades, things have changed quite radically: philosophers 
have largely favored Inseparatism over Separatism.4 Inseparatists maintain that intentional content 
and phenomenal character are in fact non-separable: they do not merely happen to be there together 
at the same time in our experience, they are (in some way or another) necessarily connected. And 
so are the phenomenal and the representational properties of the experience. So, there is no such 
thing as representationally inert phenomenal properties. 
This has given rise to further questions, choices and divides. In particular, if phenomenal 
character and intentional content are non-separable, it seems natural to ask what sort of relation 
binds them together in such a strong way. The different replies to this question generate different 
options on the inseparatist menu. 
Representationalists (e.g., Harman 1990; Dretske 1995; Tye 1995, 2000; Lycan 2001) hold 
that, e.g., the fact that there is something it is like for me to see a red car depends in some way on 
                                                      
4 I am borrowing the labels “Separatism” and “Inseparatism” from Horgan and Tienson (2002). 
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the fact that my experience represents that something is red, has a certain shape, etc. So, the 
intentionality of the experience is prior to its phenomenal character. For the purposes of this paper, 
“priority” is a quite generic term that covers a set of anti-symmetric dependence relations stronger 
than supervenience, e.g., in-virtue-of, grounding and reduction.5 
Others support PIV: phenomenal character is prior to representational content (e.g., Siewert 
1998; Horgan and Tienson 2002; Loar 2002, 2003; Horgan, Tienson and Graham, 2004; Pitt, 2004; 
Kriegel 2007, 2008, 2011, 2013). So, experience’s instantiating certain representational properties 
ultimately depends on its instantiation of certain phenomenal properties. On this account, the fact 
that I am having an experience with a reddish phenomenal character when I look at the car makes 
it the case that my experience represents that redness is instantiated by something in front of me 
now. 
Finally, still others claim that there is no priority at all: phenomenal character and 
intentionality are mutually dependent—presumably, equivalent, if not one and the same thing (e.g., 
Chalmers 2004; Pautz 2008, 2013). I call this view Egalitarianism. 
In this paper, I will set aside the debate between Separatism and Inseparatism, to better focus 
on what happens within the inseparatist field. More specifically, I will explore the connections 
between PIV and TE and the viability of a line of argument leading from the latter to the former.  
 
2.3. PIV and the representationalist way to naturalization 
Over the last two decades Representationalism has been quite popular among philosophers. 
Plausibly, this is because Representationalism seems to put us in a quite convenient position for 
providing a full naturalistic account of phenomenal character—on the assumption that we already 
have satisfying naturalistic accounts of intentionality available (Dretske 1981, 1988; Millikan 
1984, 1989; Fodor 1990). Roughly, the idea is: If representational content is prior to phenomenal 
character, then the road to the naturalization of the latter, via a naturalized account of the former, 
appears to be quite straightforward. It does seem that one “only” has to properly characterize the 
way in which phenomenal character depends on intentionality. Thereby, one kills two birds with 
                                                      
5 Our terminology needs to be broad enough to cover, and be compatible with, slightly different degrees of strength 
and interpretations of priority. Indeed, my aim is to offer the simplest taxonomy possible that allows us to group 
slightly different views (or versions of the same views) that clearly share the same background intuition—namely, 
that something is more fundamental than something else in the relation between phenomenal character and 
representational content. To my mind, the notion of priority specified above does this job. 
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one stone: one buys the naturalization of intentionality and, for basically the same price, one gets 
phenomenal character naturalized as well.  
Given this, it should not be hard to see what sort of challenge PIV raises and the deep 
consequences for the debate on phenomenal character and its naturalization. For, should PIV turn 
out to be true, the representationalist project of reducing phenomenal character to naturalized 
intentionality would be (at minimum) seriously undermined, for at least two reasons. First, if the 
proponents of PIV are right, then phenomenal character cannot be cashed out in terms of 
intentionality; rather, it is the other way around. Second, if intentionality strongly depends on 
phenomenal character, not only do the antecedent difficulties concerning the naturalization of 
phenomenal character remain untouched, but some further difficulties also arise in regard to the 
very possibility of achieving something like the naturalization of intentionality itself. For, given 
PIV, we cannot have intentionality naturalized without first having phenomenal character 
naturalized.6 
 
3 The transparency of experience 
In this section, I will introduce TE and show that it is the introspective intuition to which both 
representationalists and phenomenal intentionalists appeal (§3.1). Then (§3.2), I will add some 
further quick considerations on TE, its scope, and its capacity to rule out Separatism.  
 
3.1. TE, Representationalism, and the Phenomenal Intentionality View 
TE enjoys the favor of many philosophers. Arguably, G. E. Moore (1903) put forward the idea 
first, but TE reached the peak of its popularity in the 1990s, when Gilbert Harman (1990) and 
Michael Tye (1995) vigorously reclaimed it. Here is what the transparency datum amounts to. 
Suppose I focus on the red car-experience I am having and, in particular, on its reddish phenomenal 
character. Now, no matter how hard I try, it seems introspectively impossible for me to be aware 
of that reddish character without also being aware of the redness of the car. 
In Harman’s and Tye’s own words: 
 
                                                      
6 Of course, the upshot is not necessarily that, if PIV is true, phenomenal character cannot be naturalized; the point is 
rather that it cannot be naturalized “representationalist-style,” so to speak. However, arguably, PIV’s truth seems to 
make phenomenal character’s way toward naturalization much harder. 
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When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features 
of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her 
experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her 
experience. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about Eloise’s visual 
experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of 
your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your 
visual experience. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to 
will be features of the three. (Harman 1990: 39) 
 
Try to focus your attention on some intrinsic feature of the experience that distinguishes it 
from other experience, something other than what it is an experience of. The task seems 
impossible: one’s awareness seems always to slip through the experience to blueness and 
squareness, as instanced together in an external object. In turning one’s mind inward to 
attend to the experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on 
external features or properties. (Tye 1995: 135) 
 
In short, nothing that looks like an intrinsic, non-representational quality of experience seems 
to be revealed by introspection, but only features of (apparently) mind-independent objects. So, 
phenomenal character and representational content are non-separable: if one tries to introspect and 
focus on the phenomenal character of one’s visual experience alone, one cannot be introspectively 
aware of such phenomenal character without also being immediately aware of what one’s visual 
experience represents.  
Hence, TE minimally suggests that phenomenal character supervenes on representational 
content. For our purposes, A supervenes on B if and only if there cannot be differences in A without 
differences in B, where “cannot” expresses metaphysical necessity. At minimum, then, TE 
suggests a supervenience claim. Notice that supervenience can be a symmetric relation, so 
“phenomenal character supervenes on representational content” is to be read in such a way that 
does not exclude the other direction. 
What about phenomenal intentionalists? At least some of them appeal to TE as well. Take, 
for example, the following passage from Horgan and Tienson (2002): 
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Mental states of the sort commonly cited as paradigmatically phenomenal have intentional 
content that is inseparable from their phenomenal character. Let us consider some examples: 
first, experiences of red as we actually have them. You might see, say, a red pen on a nearby 
table, and a chair with red arms and back a bit behind the table. There is certainly something 
that the red that you see is like to you. But the red that you see is seen, first, as a property of 
objects. ... [R]edness is not experienced as an introspectible property of one’s own 
experiential state, but rather as a property of visually presented objects. (Horgan and Tienson 
2002: 521) 
 
Even though it does not make use of transparency-talk, this passage seems to state something like 
TE. Indeed, Horgan and Tienson’s point is exactly the same as the one made by Harman and Tye: 
in introspection, the features usually considered as components of phenomenal character—colors, 
shapes, etc.—are only available as properties of (apparently) mind-independent objects.7 Thus, 
phenomenal character does not seem separable from the content of the experience.  
Kriegel (2007) openly notes that TE is perfectly compatible with, and provides evidence for, 
PIV:  
 
It may be thought odd to cite the transparency of experience in defense of phenomenal 
intentionality. The transparency claim is often adduced on behalf of the attempt to naturalize 
phenomenal character by combining an intentionalist account of it with traditional 
naturalistic accounts of intentionality in terms of the representation relation. By contrast, the 
notion of phenomenal intentionality is often touted in the context of rejecting this program. 
However, regardless of the wider motivations commonly at play in these discussions, the 
transparency of experience—the fact that phenomenology appears, from the first-person 
perspective, to be inherently intentional—is surely evidence for the existence of 
phenomenally constituted intentionality. (Kriegel 2007: 321)8 
 
Thus (at least some of the) phenomenal intentionalists appeal to TE. 
 
                                                      
7 Horgan and Tienson (2002: 520) explicitly say that representationalists embrace this claim. 
8 Loar (2002) also extensively defends the compatibility of TE and PIV. 
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3.2. TE, its scope, and Separatism 
The fact that TE minimally suggests a supervenience claim seems already enough to undermine 
Separatism. For, if the latter is true, it should be possible for us to keep phenomenal character and 
content separated and introspectively spot the non-representational, intrinsic phenomenal features 
of experience as separate from the representational ones. But, this is precisely what TE rules out: 
TE tells us that it is introspectively impossible to keep phenomenal properties and representational 
properties separated from each other. So, our introspective intuitions seem to offer evidence 
against the separatist’s account of phenomenal properties as representationally inert. Therefore, it 
seems plausible to conclude that TE provides us with a prima facie strong case against Separatism.  
Of course, Separatists have tried to resist this argument in many ways and pointed at various 
cases of experiences (both perceptual and non-perceptual) in which TE seems to fail. For example, 
many have argued that the affective phenomenal character of pain or emotion does not seem to be 
entirely or satisfactorily re-describable in terms of (apparently) mind-independent object and their 
properties (De Sousa 2004; Aydede 2006; Block 2006). To some, moods and orgasms do not 
appear representational at all (Searle 1983; Block 1996, 2003; Deonna and Teroni 2012): when 
one is depressed, for example, one’s experience does not seem to represent anything, and the 
qualitative features involved in the experience do not seem to qualify any object. Finally, cases 
like blurry or double vision have been advanced as examples of non-transparent visual experiences 
(Boghossian and Velleman 1989; Smith 2008). Supporters of TE have offered their own replies 
and have tried to accommodate these cases (see, e.g., Crane 1998; Tye 1995, 1997, 2005, 2008; 
Martínez 2011; Mendelovici 2013; Kline 2015; Lycan 1996).  
Be that as it may, I will set these issues aside here. In what follows, for argument’s sake I 
will take for granted that TE stands, at least in the case of vision. More precisely, I will assume 
that visual experiences are transparent and, as such, do militate in favor of Inseparatism, at least 
as far as vision is concerned. The idea is: If TE does not speak in favor of PIV in the case of vision, 
a fortiori it does in no other case. From now on, then, I will be using the terms “experience” and 
“visual experience” as interchangeable. 
 
4 Two strong interpretations of TE 
As noted, the minimal interpretation of TE in terms of supervenience seems to offer some grounds 
to reject Separatism. But might TE suggest something less minimal and speak in favor of a positive 
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view, as opposed to only speak against Separatism? After all, the minimal interpretation does not 
exclude (at least) two further, stronger interpretations that are mutually exclusive:  
 
(SI1)  Phenomenal character is ultimately grounded in the representational 
properties of the experience. (This interpretation presupposes the priority of 
intentionality.) 
 
(SI2)  Phenomenal properties ultimately ground the kind of content we are 
experientially and introspectively aware of. (This interpretation presupposes 
the priority of phenomenal character.) 
 
Ultimately, this comes down to asking whether TE speaks in favor of Representationalism or of 
PIV, since (SI1) and (SI2) are nothing but the representationalist’s and the phenomenal 
intentionalist’s claims (respectively).9 
Notice: sociologically speaking, such a question arises only with the rise of PIV. Indeed, 
before PIV came out, there was no question that (SI1)—and thus Representationalism—was the 
right interpretation of TE. Philosophically, this was common-sense. There are at least two reasons 
for that. First, the fact that one cannot be introspectively aware of phenomenal character without 
being also aware of representational content has naturally been taken as pushing the idea of a 
certain priority of the latter over the former. (This might sound particularly natural if one’s concern 
is finding a way of getting phenomenal character naturalized.) Second, TE suggests that an internal 
relation obtains between phenomenal character and representational content. Before PIV, no other 
way of looking at that relation was out there but Representationalism, which simply was the only 
game in the inseparatist town.  
However, after the rise of PIV, things have changed. Recall the passage from Kriegel quoted 
above: he claims that TE offers direct evidence in favor of PIV. This way of reasoning is exactly 
the opposite of the one described right above. The thought here seems to be something along the 
following lines: the fact that introspection of phenomenal character reveals nothing over and above 
                                                      
9 This is another possible way of understanding the debate between Representationalism and PIV, one emphasizing 
TE’s role. 
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representational content suggests that there is at least a certain kind of content that is ultimately 
constituted by/grounded in phenomenal properties.  
I will offer more details to better spell out and fully unpack the line of reasoning behind the 
phenomenal intentionalist’s reading of TE momentarily. Let me just conclude this section with the 
following remarks. The rise of PIV as a theoretical option, and of (SI2) as a possible strong 
interpretation of TE, does not necessarily make (SI1) wrong—and thereby Representationalism 
false. It just calls into question and blocks the traditional quick and easy move from TE to (SI1). 
To prove (SI1) wrong, one has to show that (SI2) is the right interpretation of TE. This amounts to 
showing that TE speaks in favor of PIV. So, the question is: Does TE speak in favor of PIV? As 
anticipated, I am going to offer a negative answer: TE does not speak in favor of PIV against 
Representationalism.  
 
5 The Argument from Introspection Alone 
The main arguments from TE for PIV have been offered by Horgan and his collaborators (Horgan 
and Tienson 2002; Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2004). Thus, my discussion will be mainly 
focused on them. However, the target of my criticism is actually wider. For the idea that our 
introspective intuitions push us in the direction of PIV is quite widespread among the phenomenal 
intentionalists, and so is the line of argument from TE to PIV. Let me begin (this section) with 
what I will call the Argument from Introspection Alone (Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2004). 
Then (next section) I will move to the Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates (Horgan and 
Tienson 2002).10 
 
5.1. The argument reconstructed 
The most straightforward way of building up an argument from TE to PIV is simply to say that 
merely appreciating TE leads us immediately to conclude in favor of the priority of phenomenal 
character: it is equivalent to, or at least sufficient for, realizing that phenomenal character is prior 
to intentionality. This is what Horgan, Tienson and Graham (henceforth HTG) claim: 
                                                      
10 This might sound a bit weird, since the chronological order in which the arguments have been offered is actually 
the opposite. However, for dialectical purposes, it will be easier to dismiss the chronological order and start with the 
Argument from Introspection Alone in order to then present the Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates as a possible 
way of replying to my criticism.  
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To begin with, we believe that a strong case can be made for phenomenal intentionality […]. 
One important line of argumentation involves focusing the reader’s introspective attention 
on certain specific actual or potential experiences, as a way of prompting appreciation that 
such experiences reveal the presence of one or another specific kind of phenomenal 
intentionality. (2004: 301) 
 
Prima facie, this might sound a bit puzzling. We have seen that TE immediately suggests a 
supervenience claim. But whether it suggests something stronger, like a priority claim, is precisely 
what is at issue here. It is something that does not seem as manifest as HTG are suggesting, but 
rather something that has to be shown.  
However, it might well be that, when regarded in a non-naïve, theoretically sophisticated 
way, TE does lead us to conclude that phenomenal character is prior. This is probably what HTG 
have in mind. For example, consider the somewhat popular line of argument in favor of the priority 
of phenomenal character suggested by Charles Siewert (1998):  
 
Siewert’s Argument 
(P1)  Experience is assessable for accuracy in virtue of its phenomenal character. 
(P2)  Being assessable for accuracy is having representational content. 
Therefore, 
(C)  Experience has representational content in virtue of its phenomenal 
character.11 
 
It is plausible that HTG have in mind something like Siewert’s Argument. In their version, the 
truth of (P1) simply becomes introspectively manifest on the basis of TE.12 
Consider again my experience as of a red car. Among other things, that experience has a 
reddish phenomenal character. According to TE, having such a reddish phenomenal character is 
                                                      
11 Siewert extensively discusses these issues in two chapters of his book (see Siewert 1998: Ch. 6-7), but he does not 
offer an explicit, schematic reconstruction of his line of argument for the priority of phenomenal character. So, this is 
my own reconstruction of it. 
12 This would be a major difference with respect to Siewert, who does not explicitly mention TE, or to introspection 
in general, and does not seem to justify (P1) introspectively. 
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nothing but presenting redness as instantiated by some (apparently) mind-independent object. In 
other words, the condition of satisfaction of my experience—i.e., that there is something red in 
front of me—is already there when I introspectively consider phenomenal character. (More 
precisely, it is the only thing I that I can find, in being introspectively aware of phenomenal 
character.) For HTG, this fact immediately makes introspectively manifest (at least to someone 
who has the relevant theoretical tools) that my experience is assessable for accuracy in virtue of 
its phenomenal character. Thus, since being assessable for accuracy simply means having a certain 
content, my experience has representational content in virtue of its phenomenal character. 
So, here is the general structure of HTG’s argument: 
 
Argument from Introspection Alone 
(P1)  [It is introspectively manifest that] experience is assessable for accuracy in 
virtue of its phenomenal character.13 
(P2)  Being assessable for accuracy is having representational content. 
Therefore, 
(C)  Experience has representational content in virtue of its phenomenal 
character. 
 
The crucial premise here is (P1). So let us look more closely at (P1) and its justification. 
According to (P1), TE is what makes it immediately manifest that one’s experience is 
assessable for accuracy in virtue of its phenomenal character. Roughly, the idea is the following. 
When one introspects, one deals with phenomenal character. Since introspection reveals that in 
virtue of which one’s experience is assessable for accuracy (its conditions of satisfaction), and 
what one introspects is phenomenal character, experience is assessable for accuracy in virtue of its 
phenomenal character. To put this in the form of an argument: 
 
Justification of (P1) 
(#1)  Experience’s conditions of satisfaction are introspectively available. [TE]14 
                                                      
13 The square-bracketed locution, “It is introspectively manifest that,” is not part of (P1). I inserted it only to stress the 
difference between HTG’s and Siewert’s argument and to stress that, in the former, (P1) is a claim justified by 
introspection and, in particular, by TE.   
14 (#1) is nothing but a slightly more theoretically sophisticated way to put TE. 
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(#2)  What is introspectively available is phenomenal character. [Assumption] 
(#3)  Experience is assessable for accuracy in virtue of its conditions of 
satisfaction. [Assumption] 
Therefore, 
(P1)  Experience is assessable for accuracy in virtue of its phenomenal character.  
 
If we now add (P2)—the claim that being assessable for accuracy is having a representational 
content—we obtain HTG’s conclusion. From now on, I will be working with this more fully 
unpacked version of the Argument from Introspection Alone.  
 
5.2. The argument assessed 
If HTG’s argument works and is really from TE alone, then the latter really leads to the priority of 
phenomenal character. However, as I am going to argue now, TE alone does not suffice to get the 
claim that experience is assessable for accuracy, and thus has content, in virtue of its phenomenal 
character in a sense that makes true PIV and excludes Representationalism. This will take two 
steps. First, I will show that a further, controversial assumption about introspection is required and, 
thus, that the argument is not from TE alone (§5.2.1). Secondly, I will argue that, even if we grant 
the controversial assumption, the argument is still too weak to lead to the desired conclusion 
(§5.2.2).  
 
5.2.1. The argument is not from TE 
The first thing to observe is that the argument above needs some further independent 
assumptions—(P2), (#2), and (#3)—in addition to TE to get to the desired conclusion. However, 
it is unreasonable to expect an argument that does not assume literally anything more than an 
introspective datum. A reasonable requirement, then, is the following constraint (K) an argument 
has to meet in order to be from TE alone: 
 
(K)  Premises that are not justified/justifiable on the basis of TE are allowed as 
long as they are largely uncontroversial. 
 
By “largely uncontroversial” here I mean something like the following: the premise in question 
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should be largely accepted/able by, and so not an object of disagreement among, at least the people 
involved in the debate that is at stake here.  
 Why (K)? In short, because the argument has to be from introspection alone, and in 
particular from TE, and not from something else. So, we want to avoid the case in which one might 
agree with TE and still reject the conclusion of the argument. For, in that case, it would be no 
longer clear that TE is what is doing the real job of leading us to the conclusion of the argument. 
We can now apply this constraint to (P2), (#2), and (#3).  
(P2) follows from the definition of representational content we are working with, so it is 
innocuous in this context. (#3) seems innocuous as well, since it is true that we can assess our 
experience for accuracy because it has conditions of satisfaction. Finally, (#2) is a claim about 
introspection and the target of our introspective awareness. Prima facie, it looks okay: it seems 
plainly true that, in introspecting our experience, we are in some way dealing with its phenomenal 
character; nobody would really deny that. However, the point here is a bit subtler. For there is a 
real substantive question that can be raised as to what kind of awareness the locution “deal with” 
stands for: Is it direct awareness or indirect awareness? This is (highly) disputable. 
Some, representationalists included, maintain that awareness of phenomenal character is 
indirect. For example, in several places, Michael Tye claims that we become introspectively 
(indirectly) aware that experience has phenomenal character because in introspection we are 
(directly) aware of its representational content (e.g., Dretske 1995; Tye 2000: Ch. 4, 2008; Byrne 
2010; 2012). On this view, what is introspectively available is ultimately nothing but 
representational content. In contrast, (#2) suggests exactly the opposite, namely, that we are 
directly aware of phenomenal character.  
Hence, acceptance of (#2) seems strongly dependent on one’s antecedent beliefs about 
introspection and the direct target of introspective awareness. We do not have to settle this issue 
here. Given our purposes, it is sufficient to remark that (#2) is a highly controversial claim, whose 
acceptance is not obvious but seems to rest on certain specific intuitions/beliefs/theory one has 
about introspection and introspective awareness. Given (K), this is already enough to conclude 
that (#2) cannot be assumed if we want the argument to be from TE alone.  
 
5.2.2. If the argument is from TE, then it is too weak 
The fact that the argument is not from TE alone is a strong clue that TE is too weak to yield the 
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priority of phenomenal character. However, to get something more than a clue and closer to a 
proof, let us turn this argument into an argument from TE alone and show that it does not lead to 
a conclusion as strong as the priority of phenomenal character.  
The most charitable way of doing this is to grant that (#2) is uncontroversial, indeed true, 
and to make sure that (#2) is fully compatible with TE. For in principle, there are (at least) two 
interpretations of “phenomenal character:” 
 
Strong Interpretation: Phenomenal character as the instantiation of intrinsic properties of the 
experience that are representationally inert. (This is the sense of 
“phenomenal character” that the separatists favor.)  
 
Weak Interpretation:  Phenomenal character as the instantiation of properties that are ultimately 
responsible for both the phenomenal and the representational features of 
experience. 
 
I will use “phenomenal character*” to refer to the strong interpretation and “phenomenal 
character**” to refer to the weak one—I will keep using “phenomenal character” as a neutral 
expression. 
Since we have to stick to TE, we cannot assume that what we are introspectively aware of is 
phenomenal character*. So, we have to assume that we introspect phenomenal character**. Since 
this interpretation must be preserved in the whole argument, here is what we get: 
 
Argument from Introspection Alone Fully Unpacked (Modified) 
(P1’)  Experience’s conditions of satisfaction are introspectively available. [TE] 
(P2’)  What is introspectively available is phenomenal character**. [Assumption] 
 (P3’)  Experience is assessable for accuracy in virtue of its conditions of 
satisfaction. [Assumption] 




(C’)  Experience has representational content in virtue of phenomenal 
character**. 
 
Is (C’) equivalent to PIV? Surely, we can go from PIV to (C’). Indeed, the fact that experience 
represents a certain content in virtue of instantiating certain phenomenal properties implies that 
experience has such a content in virtue of certain properties that are responsible for the phenomenal 
features of experience but also for the representational ones. However, the other direction (from 
(C’) to PIV) is not guaranteed, since (C’) is compatible with a representationalist account as well. 
Let me now illustrate how. 
At first sight, the representationalist seems to face a major difficulty in explaining how 
representational properties give rise to the phenomenal features of our experience—whereas given 
what we have said so far, it seems more intuitive to go from the phenomenal properties to the 
representational ones. However, such a prima facie difficulty disappears as soon as we consider 
the following distinction between pure and impure representational properties (Chalmers 2004; 
Crane 2009; Lycan 2015). A pure representational property is the property of representing a 
content—for example, representing that the car is red. An impure representational property is the 
property of representing a content in a certain manner—perceptually, emotionally, or (even more 
specifically) visually, auditorily, etc. An example would be the property of visually representing 
that the car is red. According to standard versions of Representationalism (Tye 1995, 2000; Lycan 
1996), experiences have phenomenal properties in virtue of instantiating certain impure 
representational properties, which are responsible for both the representational and the 
phenomenal features of the experience.  
So, we have an alternative explanation of (C’) that uses representational properties, as 
opposed to phenomenal properties, as primitives. Hence, we should conclude that the argument, 
construed as relying on TE alone, leads us to a conclusion, (C’), that is simply weaker than PIV.  
To recap, firstly, we have seen that HTG’s argument is not from TE (§5.2.1). This instilled 
in us the suspicion that TE is too weak to speak in favor of PIV. So, we have reconstructed the 
argument so it flows from TE. The upshot was that, from introspection alone (TE), we could only 
conclude that experience has representational content in virtue of its phenomenal character**, 
which does not exclude Representationalism (§5.2.2).  
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6 The Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates 
One might accept that TE is too weak to support PIV by itself, and still think that the real problem 
is not TE’s alleged weakness, but the additional set of premises we accompany TE with. So, 
perhaps if we engineer an argument that combines it with the right non-introspective assumptions, 
TE really supports PIV. Horgan and Tienson (2002) seem to offer such an argument: it still relies 
on TE, but makes use of a different argumentative machinery. More precisely, it appeals to 
phenomenal duplicates. Two creatures are phenomenal duplicates “just in case each creature’s 
total experience, throughout its existence, is phenomenally exactly similar to the other’s” (Horgan 
and Tienson 2002: 524). Roughly, the idea is this: If entirely phenomenal creatures have 
intentional experiences, then we can conclude that the instantiation of phenomenal properties 
determines at least a certain kind of representational content—the one shared by me and every 
phenomenal duplicate of mine. The appeal to phenomenal duplicates, thus, is an attempt of 
“filtering out” every non-phenomenal feature of experience to see whether we manage to get 
intentionality out of that.15  
Intuitively put, the argument goes as follows. Consider, once again, my experience as of a 
red car: this experience has a red car-ish phenomenal character. If so, then the duplicates will have 
an experience with a red car-ish phenomenal character as well, since their experiences are 
phenomenally indistinguishable from mine. Now, as we know from TE, that my experience has a 
red car-ish phenomenal character means nothing but that certain properties, like redness, a certain 
shape, etc., appear to be properties of (apparently) mind-independent object. Since my duplicates 
and I share the same phenomenal character, this is to be true of their experiences too. So, precisely 
like me, in undergoing an experience with a red car-ish phenomenal character, the duplicates will 
be having experiences that are as of an external world, as of objects, as of properties of objects, 
etc. But, then, the duplicates have experiences that not only have the same phenomenal character, 
but also the same representational content as mine. If so, it seems that the instantiation of certain 
phenomenal properties alone determines experience’s having a certain representational content—
as PIV claims.  
In other words, the idea is that the following claim about phenomenal duplicates’ mental 
lives is sufficient for PIV: 
                                                      
15 Horgan and Tienson (2002) explicitly declare this.  
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(PD)  There is a kind of representational content shared by any two phenomenal 
duplicates. 
 
Here is the Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates, then: 
 
Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates 
(P1)  There is a kind of representational content shared by any two phenomenal 
duplicates. [TE plus the conceivability of the phenomenal duplicates] 
(P2)   If there is a kind of representational content that is shared by any two 
phenomenal duplicates, then experience’s instantiating certain phenomenal 
properties determines a certain kind of representational content. 
[Assumption]  
(C) Experience’s instantiating certain phenomenal properties determines a 
certain kind of representational content. [From (P1) and (P2)] 
 
Notice that, unlike the previous one, this new argument does not claim that PIV is simply 
phenomenally manifest given our introspective intuitions (TE). The idea here is rather that, in order 
to conclude that PIV is true, we have to play a bit with what we gather from introspection and 
perform the phenomenal duplicates thought experiment.  
So, the Argument from Phenomenal Duplicate does not seem to aim to be from introspection 
alone. Still, it is surely an argument that strongly appeals to and heavily relies on introspection and 
TE, in the following sense. First, the material we need to perform the phenomenal duplicates 
thought experiment comes from introspection—and this material is nothing but TE itself. Second, 
TE is what secures the thought experiment’s outcome, i.e. that there is a kind of representational 
content shared by me and my phenomenal duplicates. It is thus crucial for the argument. So, should 
this new strategy be successful, we would still have serious reasons to claim that TE speaks in 
favor of PIV. 
As just noted, (P1) is justified by TE in combination with further assumptions concerning 
the conceivability of the phenomenal duplicates that are not problematic in the present context, 
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because a representationalist would agree that phenomenal duplicates are conceivable. Thus, (P1) 
is fine. The problems are with (P2): I will now argue that (PD) is not sufficient for PIV. 
 (PD) is equivalent to the following claim:  
 
(PD’)  Necessarily, for any two pair of experiences E and E’ of any two 
phenomenal duplicates, if E and E’ instantiate the same phenomenal 
property P, then there is a representational property R that they both 
instantiate.  
 
(PD’) states that a modal correlation obtains between the instantiation of phenomenal properties 
and the instantiation of representational properties: if (PD) is true, then (at least) certain 
representational properties supervene on phenomenal properties. Yet, supervenience (even in its 
strongest form) is not sufficient for priority: grounding or even reduction are much stronger 
relations. As McLaughlin and Bennett (2014) correctly note: 
 
Supervenience is not a relation of ontological priority; the supervenience of A on B does not 
guarantee that B-properties are ontologically prior to A-properties. One way to see this is to 
note that ontological priority is irreflexive and asymmetrical: nothing can be ontologically 
prior to itself, or be ontologically prior to something that is also ontologically prior to it […]. 
But as we have seen, supervenience is reflexive and not asymmetrical. (McLaughlin and 
Bennett 2014: §3.5) 
 
If so, then one could well accept (PD) without thereby being forced to accept PIV. As it 
happens, this is precisely what representationalists do: they agree with (PD) but not with PIV. On 
the contrary, they offer exactly the opposite explanation: in figuring out the phenomenal duplicates 
scenario, we get a modal correlation between phenomenal properties and (impure) representational 
properties because the latter are prior to the former. This explanation is perfectly compatible with 
(PD). 
To sum up, the main problem with the Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates is that the 
phenomenal duplicates thought experiment is not sufficient to establish PIV’s truth. In other words, 
(P2) is false. Indeed, if (PD) is true, then phenomenal properties necessarily bring along certain 
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representational properties. Yet, this does not mean that they ground those properties: it may just 
be that phenomenal properties are identical with, or even grounded in, those representational 
properties.16 
We can appreciate the point in another way. Recall that according to TE, we cannot be aware 
of phenomenal character without also being aware of representational content. If we really want 
to stick to this introspective datum, we have to admit that what we are calling here “phenomenal 
duplicates” are in fact phenomenal intentional duplicates—i.e., creatures with experiences that 
instantiate properties which are ultimately responsible for both the phenomenal and the 
representational features of those experiences. Now, such duplicates simply constitute too weak a 
case for PIV, since we are not guaranteed that they have experiences that represent in virtue of 
their purely phenomenal nature: it might well be that their experiences represent in virtue of 
instantiating certain (impure) representational properties that also ground the phenomenal 
features.17 
To exploit again the phenomenal character*/phenomenal character** opposition: it seems 
that to prove that PIV is true, one should find a way to show how we get representational content 
from phenomenal character*. Yet, TE is simply too weak to do that:18 it does allow us to see that 
there is a strict relation between phenomenal properties and representational properties, but it does 
not allow us to isolate phenomenal properties—and this is required, if we want to show that they 
ground representational content. 
Here is the upshot, then. The Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates combines TE with 
some modal assumptions concerning the conceivability of the duplicates and a too strong, and 
ultimately false, claim: (P2). So, the phenomenal duplicates thought experiment does not help us 
extract PIV out of TE—it is not really a good solution to our problems. The problem is not just 
one of engineering or finding the right combination of premises to combine TE with, but concerns 
TE itself.  
 
                                                      
16 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for this formulation. 
17 In a way, we are back to the issue we had with the previous argument. Arguing from TE alone forces us to weaken 
our notion of phenomenal character into a notion that has to include intentionality in phenomenal character from the 
very beginning. Once we do that, though, we are no longer in a position to determine whether phenomenal character 
is intentional qua phenomenal, since we are clearly not dealing with something purely phenomenal. 
18 Not necessarily incompatible though. See Loar (2002). 
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7 An objection: The priority is epistemic 
Let me consider the following objection: 
 
Alright! Maybe there is no way to determine a metaphysical priority of phenomenal 
character on the basis of TE alone. However, when we advance introspective considerations, 
we offer phenomenological descriptions of our experience, in the first place. And it seems 
that, on the basis of those phenomenological descriptions of our experience, we are in fact 
able to assign conditions of satisfaction, and thereby intentionality, to it. So perhaps, on the 
basis of TE alone, we can establish at least an epistemic priority of the phenomenal concepts 
we make use of in our phenomenological descriptions, since they seem to be enough to 
capture the intentional features of our experience. 
 
Very quickly, here is my reply. It is true that in the introspective reports under consideration we 
make use of phenomenal concepts. Yet, we use representational notions too, such as “conditions 
of satisfaction,” “assessable for accuracy,” etc., and these notions seem to play a crucial role in our 
description of experience as intentional. So, as far as our introspective descriptions are concerned, 
since the descriptions of phenomenal character necessarily involve the use of representational 
concepts, one might well say (i) that it is precisely on the basis of those representational notions 
that we are able to capture the representational features of our experience and (ii) that phenomenal 
character can be fully captured in intentional terms.  
In order to show the priority of phenomenal concepts, the phenomenal intentionalist should 
offer a re-description of the intentionality of the experience in terms of phenomenal concepts alone, 
or show how the representational notions can be analyzed in terms of phenomenal concepts. But 
they do neither of these things—and it is hard to see how they could, relying on TE alone. 
 
8 Taking stock 
Let us now take stock. After describing the background and clarifying the terminology (§2), I 
introduced TE and showed that it is the introspective intuition to which both representationalists 
and (at least some) phenomenal intentionalists appeal to (§3). This secures my first claim: 
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(1)  Representationalists and phenomenal intentionalists appeal to the same 
introspective datum, TE. 
 
TE minimally suggests a supervenience claim, which seems already enough to rule out 
Separatism—in this paper, I did not call this into question.  
In section 4, I distinguished two further possible strong interpretations compatible with the 
minimal one, (SI1) and (SI2), that are mutually exclusive: 
 
(SI1)  Phenomenal character is ultimately grounded in the representational 
properties of the experience. 
 
(SI2)  Phenomenal properties ultimately ground the kind of content we are 
experientially and introspectively aware of. 
 
(SI1) and (SI2) are nothing but (respectively) Representationalism and PIV. Given the standard 
association of Representationalism and TE, the question immediately became whether TE speaks 
in favor of PIV.  
To answer this question, I discussed the two arguments proposed by Horgan and 
collaborators that flesh out the line of argument from TE to PIV. Here are the results.  
As regards the Argument from Introspection Alone, in the best case—i.e., the case in which 
(#2) is true and the argument is genuinely from TE alone—, we get the conclusion that experience 
has representational content in virtue of phenomenal character**. This is compatible with 
Representationalism and thus too weak to speak in favor of PIV.  
The worst cases, the ones that we set aside or were not even considered in our discussion for 
sake of charity, are instead the following three: 
 
1. If (#2) is just controversial, then the argument is not from TE. 
2. If (#2) is false, then the argument is to be rejected.  
3. The argument assumes the strong interpretation of phenomenal character*: it is 
incompatible with TE and thus to be rejected. 
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On the other hand, the Argument from Phenomenal Duplicates claims that the phenomenal 
duplicates thought experiment is enough to establish PIV’s truth. But, as we have seen, this is 
simply false: the duplicate scenario is not sufficient for PIV’s truth. So, the argument is to be 
rejected. 
This leads us to the second claim I am defending here, that is: 
  
(2)  Arguing from TE to PIV leads us to the following trilemma: Either (a) the argument 
is too weak or (b) it is not from TE or (c) it is to be rejected—where (a) is the best 
case and (b) and (c) the worst cases. 
 
9 Conclusion 
What is the upshot, then? The discussion has highlighted that TE has two faces: it suggests a strong 
connection between phenomenal character and representational content; yet, precisely because of 
that, it does not allow us to introspectively consider phenomenal character as separated from 
representational content. And this seems to be somewhat in tension with the phenomenal 
intentionalist’s desiderata and needs. For, to establish the priority of phenomenal character, we 
seem to need a clear way to go from phenomenal properties to representational properties.  
The conclusion I suggest we should draw is that the line of argument for PIV that relies on 
our introspective intuitions (TE) in such a strong way is not really a good strategy for the 
phenomenal intentionalist: at best, it does not get her where she would like; at worst, it might 
generate serious trouble.  
Now, one might be tempted to see this as a somewhat indirect argument against PIV and in 
favor of Representationalism. The thought might be: Since TE does not speak in favor of PIV, it 
is in favor of Representationalism. Let me block this immediately. This is not what my conclusion 
suggests. First of all, that TE is too weak to speak in favor of PIV against Representationalism 
does not mean that there is no good argument for PIV at all: it just means that arguing from TE is 
not a good strategy to support PIV. Secondly, not speaking in favor of X is not one and the same 
as speaking against X—and here I’ve only been concerned with the former (as it concerns TE 
speaking in favor of PIV). Given my conclusion, the two strong interpretations, (SI1) and (SI2), are 
still there as legitimate options. In order to prove that PIV is not really viable given TE, one would 
have to show that the latter speaks in favor of Representationalism. After all, it might well be that 
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TE does not speak in favor of either. 
This surely opens further questions concerning TE’s strength and its capacity for supporting 
any claim about priority and, more generally, about the existence of a priority relation between 
phenomenal character and intentionality. These further questions cannot be answered here, but are 
material for another paper.19 
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